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INTRAGOVERNMENTAL POWER RELATIONS IN THE
EXPENDITURE OF FEDERAL FUNDS THROUGH
LOCAL GOVERNMENTAL BODIES: THE PUBLIC
HOUSING AUTHORITY DILEMMA UNDER
THE BROOKE AMENDMENTS
I.

INTRODUCTION

Revenue sharing, the concept that local operations could be funded
through federally collected monies, was initiated 35 years ago through the
creation of local housing authorities (LHA's) under the United States
Housing Act of 1937.1 When viewed as a precursor to the modern
approach to revenue sharing, the contract mechanism provided for in the
Act is woefully deficient, for many LHA's are faced with serious financial
difficulties. In 1969, the first Brooke amendment to the Housing Act
placed a rent ceiling on the LHA's restricting rental charges to 25 per cent
of a tenant's family income. 2 Although later Brooke amendments appropriated funds to help the LHA's reduce operating deficits,3 the LHA's
contend that the United States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) has not distributed these funds. Consequently, LHA
deficits have increased, 4 causing the LHA's to consume their reserve funds
and approach bankruptcy. Although these deficits may be attributable to
many sources including inadequate congressional appropriations, executive
impoundment of funds, and unjustified LHA expenditures, a number of
LHA's have initiated suit against the federal government to compel complete subsidy payment, or alternatively, to enjoin application of the rent
ceiling. 5 The purpose of this Comment is fourfold: (1) to explore the
rights of the parties to the LHA contracts to maintain a suit against
HUD; (2) to analyze the Housing Act to ascertain the present responsibility of, and authorization for, HUD to meet the LHA's operational
1. Act of Sept. 1, 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888. The present Act may be found
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401-36 (1970).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (Supp. I, 1971), amending 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (1970).
Senator Brooke's amendment also protected welfare recipients against state cuts in
their benefits resulting from their rental savings. This amendment is symptomatic of
the suspicion perceptible in state-federal relations in the field of human services.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(a) (1970) permitted the subsidies to be used: (1) to
assure the low-rent character of the housing projects involved, and (2) to maintain
adequate operating and reserve funds.
4. See notes 19-20 infra.
5. NAHRO, an association of public housing administrators, has combined with
several other LHA's in bringing a suit for declaratory and injunctive relief to force
HUD to provide full operating subsidies. NAHRO v. HUD, Civil No. 2080-72
(D.D.C., filed Oct. 16, 1972). Cf. Norfolk Redev. & Housing Authority v. HUD,
Civil No. 298-72-N (E.D. Va., filed June 13, 1972).
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deficits; (3) to study the power of the executive branch to impound funds
once authorized;" and (4) to suggest that the problems in the public
housing area reflect the problems of all federal-state revenue sharing
relationships, particularly those that are intertwined with economic and
social problems of national scope.
Immediately following its opening session, the 93rd Congress launched
into a dispute with the President and executive agencies over monies
7
withheld from congressionally created categorical grants-in-aid programs.
This Comment assumes that the public housing program is representative
of many categorical grant-in-aid programs, notwithstanding the existence
of some provisions affording the program unusual protections. Its effectiveness as a mechanism for implementing governmental objectives will therefore be viewed as means through which to analyze basic intergovernmental
relations when disputes arise over compliance with congressional intent.
Because, however, the Congress and the President have also initiated a
new program of federal revenue sharing, the 1972 Act for Federal Assistance to State and Local Governments (Revenue Sharing Act),8 this
Comment will also explore the mechanism contemplated for its administration with a view to determining whether funds may be withheld under
that program as they have been withheld in categorical grant-in-aid
programs.
One caveat must be included with respect to the complex circumstances
surrounding the public housing authority dilemma. Because it has involved human services in a highly political climate, HUD's response to
local housing authorities has changed on a daily basis. This Comment
merely attempts to sketch a broad picture with reference to data available
at a fixed point in time.9 In addition, the administrative mechanics of the
6. Throughout this Comment impoundment will be used to refer to any means by
which funds authorized and appropriated for an annual period by Congress are not
expended during that period. In the public housing program, such withholding can
occur from mandate by the President, control by the Office of Management and
Budget, or at the various levels of administration within the Department of Housing
and Urban Development. See notes 126-30 infra. For an examination of the impoundment problems of other federal programs, see Church, Impoundment of Appropriated
Funds: The Decline of Congressional Control Over Executive Discretion, 22 STAN.
L. REV. 1240, 1244 (1970), wherein Senator Church discusses impoundment problems
arising in defense projects and civilian spending. The impoundment issue has become
particularly critical to local governments within the last year. See, e.g., Wall Street
Journal, Dec. 15, 1972, at 1, col. 5, which notes that several governors and mayors
have attacked President Nixon's recent impoundment of highway, pollution, and
welfare appropriations.
7. 119 CONG. REc. 2245-48 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1973) (remarks of Senator Byrd)
119 CoNG. REc. 2105-10 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1973) (remarks of Senators McClellan,
Hughes, Proxmire & Byrd).
8. Act of Oct. 20, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-512, 86 Stat. 919.
9. HUD's data comes from the LHA's which are already overworked with the
compilation of data and enumerable day-to-day management problems. Rental income
figures and operational costs fluctuate widely depending on tenant responsiveness,
vandalism, the need for specialized social services, and utility costs. Consequently, cost
and income estimates are rapidly outdated, and data which one authority considers
essential may be ignored by other authorities. Telephone interview with John Shaw,
Chief of Financial Management Branch, Program Services Division, U.S. Dep't of
Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C., Sept. 7, 1972 [hereinafter cited
as Shaw Interview].
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Revenue Sharing Act are, as yet, largely undefined, but the Act does
establish the limits within which local governmental units are entitled to
federal dollars, and sets forth the remedies and procedures for enforcing
the federal obligations.' 0 This Comment assumes that analysis of the
LHA-HUD controversy establishes a context in which to determine the
future balance of power in federal-state revenue sharing programs.
II.

THE PUBLIC HOUSING AUTHORITY

A

IN THE FEDERAL CONTEXT:

FACTUAL DESCRIPTION

In recognition of the national need for increased low-income housing,
Congress passed the 1968 Housing and Urban Development Act" which
adopted a ten-year national housing goal of constructing or rehabilitating
26 million housing units, of which 6 million were intended for low and
moderate income families.' 2 Of the 26 million units established as a goal,
1,226,000 were to be new units of public housing,"3 a figure exceeding the
total public housing units in operation in 1971.14 Although sometimes
criticized, 15 public housing units have constituted a substantial part of the
federal housing program concept since the initial authorization of $5
million was established in the 1937 Act.' 6
During the 1960's the LHA's experienced the pinch of wage and price
increases, as well as a substantial increase in vandalism. Representative
William F. Ryan of New York, speaking in support of the 1970 Housing
10. The Act specifically states that the local governmental units are entitled to
monies for which they qualify. Act of Oct. 20, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-512, §§ 107, 108,
142(b) & 143, 86 Stat. 919.
11. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1441 et seq. (1970).
12. See id. § 1441a. The House report noted that at the time the Act was adopted
there were 6 million families living in substandard housing. See U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2900 (1968). The report also noted:
[A]pplications for public housing, in terms of number of units, are being submitted
by local housing agencies at an increasing rate, demonstrating that the demand
for public housing units will be great and continuing during the next decade.
HUD reports that the number of units in the status of applications pending has
grown from about 35,000 in February 1966, to 68,000 in February 1967, to 125,000
in February 1968 . . . . Applications for additional units are being submitted at
an annual rate of about 14,000 units.
Id. at 2901.
13. Genung, Public Housing - Success or Failure?, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 734,
745-46 (1971). See Franklin, Federal Power and Subsidized Housing, 3 URBAN LAW.
61, 62 (1971), wherein the author notes that the national commitment is not achieving
results since the second report on the national housing goals showed a delayed start-up
requiring a greater number of total units than required by the national goal to be
built in the later years.
14. Genung, supra note 13, at 745-46.
15. See, e.g., 116 CONG. REc. 694 (1970) (remarks of Representative Rarick that
federal expenditures for public housing accommodated social "parasites" at the expense
of the working man).
16. See Act of Sept. 1, 1937, ch. 896, § 10(e), 50 Stat. 888. See also SENATE
COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, CONGRESS AND AMERICAN HOUSING, S. Doc.

No.

89-102, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-7 (1968), which provides a history of annual contribution contract authorizations through 1967. The total federal housing program includes
a large number of separate programs administered by the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board, the Federal Housing Administration, the Urban Renewal Board, and the
Federal National Mortgage Association. Id.
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and Urban Development Act, which increased authorizations for annual
contribution contracts, noted:
Public housing costs have been rising rapidly in recent years, and
rental income has been running well below operating costs for many
local housing authorities, the agencies that manage federally supported
public housing. With federal government payments restricted until
late 1969 to capital costs (and small supplementary payments for the
elderly and a few other groups), the result has been a rapid growth in
operating 17deficits. "Crisis" is not too strong a word to describe the
situation.

In addition, public housing remains torn between serving those persons
most in need of public services - who are also most likely to default in
rent payments - and selecting tenants who are more likely to make
regular payments.18 Further, management and service costs attendant to
the provision of housing for the most troubled of the poor tend to exacerbate
the LHA's financial crisis.
17. 116 CONG. REC. 39,468, 39,472 (1970), citing F. DE LEEUW, OPERATING COSTS
IN PUBLIC HoUSING - A FINANCIAL CRISIS (1970). de Leeuw concluded "that the
gap between costs and rents almost certainly will continue to emerge and grow for
many local housing authorities in the near future, certainly so long as prices and
wages continue to rise." Id. See Genung, supra note 13, at 755.
Representative Ryan also asserted that while there were almost 500,000
people seeking public housing accommodations, fiscal shortages threatened new construction. 116 CONG. REC. 39,472 (1970).
The proposed legislation would have
appropriated $150 million for fiscal 1971, $275 million for 1972, $300 million for
1973, and $350 million for 1974. This was a noticeable increase over the previous
subsidies of $75 million in 1969 and $75 million in 1970 (plus $35 million for special
family subsidies). Id. An estimated 100,000 units were constructed annually in 1968,
1969, and 1970. Genung, supra note 13, at 736.
The public housing crisis has also been influenced by such diverse problems
as inadequate technological capabilities, increased land costs, and exclusionary zoning
patterns. See 116 CONG. REC. 3984 (1970) (remarks of Representative Halpern).
Special efforts have been undertaken by HUD, the Executive, and Congress
to eliminate management problems. See U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, Circular HM 4381.2, app. 4, Jan. 7, 1972 (pre-feasibility criteria of management contracts) (hereinafter cited as Circular HM 4381.2] ; Exec. Order No. 11668,
37 Fed. Reg. 8057 (1972) (providing for a national center for housing management) ;
Letter from Julian Lowe, Research & Technology Division, U.S. Dep't of Housing
and Urban Development, July 28, 1972 (special projects authorized by Congress in
thirteen cities for experiments in LHA management).
18. See generally NATIONAL COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, MORE THAN SHELTER
AND SOCIAL NEEDS IN LOW AND MODERATE INCOME HOUSING (1969); Ledbetter,
Public Housing - A Social Experiment Seeks Acceptance, 32 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 490 (1967); Comment, Nonfinancial Eligibility and Eviction Standards in
Public Housing - The Problem Family in the Great Society, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 1122
(1968) ; Comment, Public Landlords and Private Tenants: The Eviction of "Undesirables" from Public Housing Projects, 77 YALE L.J. 988 (1968).
There are also potential pressures from private landlords who oppose the
competition from public housing operations for the most desirable of low income
tenants. Interview with Robert Embry, Jr., Director of Baltimore Housing and
Redevelopment Authority, in Baltimore, Aug. 10, 1972 [hereinafter cited as Embry
Interview].
The growth of management problems is the most significant problem in the
current administration of public housing. To curb such problems, HUD issued a
special transmittal notice covering detailed stipulations as to management contracts
for both subsidized and non-subsidized housing units. Interview with Mr. Anthony
Gilespi, Director of Philadelphia Area Office, U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban
Development, in Philadelphia, Mar. 23, 1972 [hereinafter cited as Gilespi Interview].
See Circular HM 4381.2, supra note 17. See also Mulvihill, Problems in the Manageinent of Public Housing, 35 TEMP. L.Q. 163 (1962).
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Information distributed by the National Association of Housing and
Redevelopment Officials (NAHRO) shows that, as of December 31, 1971,
eighty-one (81) housing authorities were running monthly deficits of
from $1.39 per unit to $38.20 per unit,' 9 with Chicago, San Francisco,
and Washington, D.C., posting the largest deficits. 20 NAHRO estimated
that the total aggregate deficit for all LHA's at the end of fiscal 1971 was
$44 million, and that the surplus appropriation authorization available to
21
HUD to offset this deficit was $130 million.
There has been continual disagreement between LHA's and HUD
over whether such operational deficits are caused by uncontrollable wageprice increases or poor local management.22 The Brooke amendment, placing a ceiling on rental charges at 25 per cent of the tenant's family income, 23
brought the financial crisis into dramatic focus. The president of NAHRO
described the problem in detail, concluding that the Senate committee was
properly concerned over the "lax management in many housing projects
that has led to high operating costs, deterioration of property, and an
intolerable environment for the families who live there. '24 Despite its
recognition of local management problems, NAHRO nevertheless took
exception to HUD's implementation of the initial Brooke amendment.
Among several disputed points, NAHRO expressly opposed:
The policy decision to condition assistance on standards of management
practice and tenant responsibility apparently to be determined solely
by HUD and without reference to some of the present circumstances
not related to either of these matters. This is somewhat like those
who are ill demonstrating good health before they can receive medical
25
treatment.
19. NAHRO, Major Size LHA's with Serious Financial Problems, July 11, 1972
(received from NAHRO upon request of Sept. 13, 1972).
20. Id. Cities with highest monthly per unit deficits were Chicago ($38.20), San
Francisco ($35.58), Washington ($34.92), St. Louis ($29.52), Boston ($28.93), Detroit
($26.80), Portland ($26.23), Baltimore ($26.10), Seattle ($24.70), Newark ($23.58),
and New York ($21.70). Id.
21. Telephone interview with Mary Nenno, Associate Director for Program and
Policy Research, NAHRO, Washington, D.C., Sept. 22, 1972 [hereinafter cited as
Nenno Interview]; Telephone interview with Herbert Pensil, Acting Director of the
Division of Program Budget Development, U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, Washington, D.C., Sept. 25, 1972 [hereinafter cited as Pensil Interview].
According to Mr. Pensil, the total surplus appropriation authorization should also
include $8,900,000 not committed for 1973. An additional request in the amount of
$150,000,000 is presently before Congress. See 117 CONG. REc. 21167 (daily ed. Dec.
10, 1971).
22. See Genung, supra note 13, at 743-49.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (Supp. I, 1971).
24. Nenno, Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969, 27 J.HOUSING 16
(1970).
25. Genung, Where We Have Come with the "Brooke Amendment", 27 J.
HOUSING 232, 234 (1970). The author quoted another NAHRO statement:
We view the conference language as a directive by the Congress to local housing
authorities, tenants, and HUD to develop a concept of a sound physical and social
environment in public housing and to utilize some of the assistance provided to
develop management and maintenance practices that will produce such an environment. This is not an easy task that can be solved by any one of these three
parties independently, or that can be approached from a viewpoint solely of
cutting back funds for current practices.
Id. Other points of disagreement included: (1) HUD's view that the subsidy formula
was only connected to the rent ceiling rather than in general support of the total
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Housing authorities, already in financial straits, were placed on the
brink of bankruptcy. As a result of HUD's demanding improved management techniques before approving new operational subsidies and its narrow
reading of the congressional intent to make subsidies generally available,
the annual contribution contracts, designed to eliminate the deficits created
by the 1969 rent ceiling, were not fully implemented. Congressman Ryan
noted this problem:
The other example of administrative hostility to public law was demonstrated this year by the implementation of the so-called Brooke
amendment, which was incorporated in section 213 of the Housing
and Urban Development Act of 1969. This was aimed at providing
additional funds for local public housing authorities so that they would
neither have to raise rentals nor sacrifice needed services. The regulations issued by the Department of Housing and Urban Development
clearly demonstrated a posture of antipathy toward this amendment
by their restrictive language and by the bars they erected to a straightforward - not to mention generous - interpretation of legislative
intent.
The consequence has been that the Senate, in the version of the
Housing and Urban Development Act which it passed on September
23 - S. 4368 - included new provisions which
will require that
26
the intent of the Brooke amendment is realized.
The policy of providing aid to low-income tenants was jeopardizing the
LHA's, and Senator Brooke attempted to clarify his intended effect. In
a letter published in the NAHRO Journal, Senator Brooke set out the
need for additional Housing Act amendments:
Last year, Congress enacted Section 213 of the housing act which set
a ceiling of 25 percent on the rent which public housing tenants were
required to pay and provided funding to improve the level of operating
and maintenance services and reserve funds. While the rent ceiling
went into effect, Congressional intent was not carried out with respect
to providing funds for improving operating and maintenance services
and adequate reserves. Accordingly, Section 210 of the 1970 act was
proposed and enacted, thus resolving any uncertainties regarding this
matter. 27
Continuing his commitment to effectuate a workable public housing program, Senator Brooke, along with Senator Mondale, has since introduced
amendments to the 1971 Housing Bill in S.2049 which calls for standardization of the housing subsidy requirements and a single flexible subsidy and
purpose of the Act; (2) HUD's belief that the Act was intended to provide only
short-term assistance rather than long-range amendments to the annual contribution
contracts; and (3) HUD's interpretation that it alone controlled the income eligibility
requirements. Id. at 233-34.
26. 116 CONG. REC. 39,476 (1970) (remarks of Representative Ryan). President
Nixon created a more humorous state of affairs by publicly criticizing Congress for
its slowness in responding to an administration housing bill which turned out to be nonexistent. See 116 CONG. REC. 19,760-62 (1970) (remarks of Representative Patman).
27. Letter from Senator Edward W. Brooke to NAHRO Administrators, Jan. 24,
1972, in 28 J. HOUSING 23 (1971). See 117 CONG. REC. 21,566 (daily ed. Dec. 13,
1971) (remarks of Senator Brooke).
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income formulation.2 8 The proposed subsidy formula purports to cover the
difference between the total cost of maintaining a LHA - including debt
service, management, maintenance, operational costs, real estate taxes, and
tenant services - and the amount of rents and other income. 29 The only
amendments passed, however, provided for the application of the rent
ceiling to welfare recipients, and that their welfare payments should not
30
be reduced because of the rent ceiling.
In 1972, Senator Brooke again addressed himself to LHA's, emphasizing his commitment to full implementation of the authorized operational subsidies to relieve LHA's from the financial squeeze created in part
by the rent ceilings. 31 In an address on the floor of the Senate, he stated
his view of the enactments:
It is the clear intent of the 1969 legislation that the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development make annual contribution payments
pursuant to rent reductions under Section (2) (1) of the United
States Housing Act of 1937 without delay, and without other administrative qualifications, in order that local housing agencies
can con32
tinue their operations without curtailment of services.
Assistant Secretary Watson of HUD similarly assured the LHA's and
NAHRO:
HUD appreciates and understands the uncertainties and changes that
have been created by recent legislative actions. We want to cooperate
and work as closely as possible with the LHAs to make sure that the
low-rent public housing program is administered and funded to provide
maximum33 possible benefit for the residents the program is intended
to serve.

Despite these good intentions, the stubborn problems of contract renegotiations, administrative modifications, and policy determination conflicts still
left an estimated aggregate deficit of $44 million at the end of fiscal 1972,
with a remaining surplus of authorized appropriations of $138 million. 34
Consequently, some LHA's initiated court action to obtain those funds
which continued administrative negotiation and legislative action had failed
35
to produce.

III.

RIGHTS OF THE PARTIES FOR A HEARING ON THE MERITS

Under the amendments to the 1937 Housing Act, 36 the bulk of financing
for local public housing is provided through the long-term capital in28. 117 CONG. REC. 21,158 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1971) (remarks of Senator Brooke).
29. Id.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (Supp. I, 1971).

31. Senator Edward W. Brooke, HUD Assistant Secretary Norman V. Watson
Explain How New Public Housing Rent Deductions and Operating Subsidies Will
Be Funded by HUD, 29 J. HouSING 69, 71 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Brooke
& Watson].
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See Pensil Interview, supra note 21.
35. NAHRO v. HUD, Civil No. 2080-72 (D.D.C., filed Oct. 16, 1972).
36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401 et seq. (1970).
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vestment of private funds in tax-free bonds3 7 which are guaranteed by
the federal government.38 The bonds are secured by a first lien on HUD's
annual contributions to the LHA,39 as well as on the rents, revenues, fees,
40
and other income in excess of the operating expenditures of the LHA.
The Act provides for the termination or reduction of an annual contribution
contract upon the breach of certain conditions, including a change in the
low-rent character of the project, 41 an insufficient local contribution, 42 or

destruction of the facilities. 43 The long-term success of the funding mechanism, at least in concept, depends more on the stability of the LHA's and
the federal contributions contracts than on the availability of adequate
security upon default. An early commentator on the federal public housing
program remarked:
In view of the fact that the annual contributions constitute the basic
source of security for the bonds, and in view of the foregoing circumstances under which these annual contributions may be reduced or
terminated, it is a tribute to the investment banking fraternity that a
large and growing market for these obligations has been developed
44

[I]t is obviously of the utmost legal and financial significance that
these annual contributions be continued
as long as the obligations
45
which they secure are outstanding.
State law authorizes the public housing agency, 46 and further provides
for the sale of bonds to finance construction of low-income housing 47 and
the negotiation of annual contributions contracts with the federal government.48 Additionally, state law articulates limits on the enforcement of such
37. Id. § 1405(d).
38. Id. § 1421a(c). This pledge is reproduced on the face of the bond and signed
by the Secretary of HUD. Interview with Dudley Finch, Secretary-Treasurer of the
Wilmington Housing Authority, in Wilmington, Del., Sept. 11, 1972 [hereinafter
cited as Finch Interview]. For an examination of short-term notes as used in other
aspects of LHA financing, see Miller, Public Housing and Its Financing, in ABA
PUBLIC HOUSING 6 (1946).

39. 42 U.S.C. § 1421a (1970).
40. Id. § 1421a(c).
41.
42.
43.
a third

Id. § 1415(3).
Id. § 1410(h).
Id. §§ 1413, 1414. The Act also provides for termination of the contract if
party acquires the project. Id. §§ 1410(l), 1413(a). See Miller, supra note

38, at 13.
44. Miller, supra note 38, at 14. The land values on all Wilmington projects
certainly exceed the outstanding obligation on the bonds. Finch Interview, supra
note 38.
45. See Miller, supra note 38, at 13.
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1402(11) (1970). As an example of a state law which grants
the local public housing authority the necessary power to effectuate the purposes of
the public housing law, see PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 1550 (1964). See also Berwick
Lumber & Supply Co. v. Harrisburg, 52 Dauphin 275 (C.P. Pa. 1942) (housing
authority possesses no powers, privileges, or immunities other than those given to it
by the state).
47. See, e.g., PA. STAT. tit. 35, § 1557 (1964).
48. Id.
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bonds or obligations, and usually limits liability for such bonds to the
public housing authority, 49 which can itself sue or be sued. 50
Notwithstanding provisions at the state and federal level protecting all
persons, corporations, and governmental units that have a financial interest
in the operation of the LHA, Congress intended the primary beneficiaries
to be those persons of low income who would otherwise be unable to afford
adequate housing.5 1 The statement of purpose in the Act specifically
enumerates a priority in serving urban, rural, non-farm, and Indian families,
with particular emphasis on large families 52 and the elderly. 3 The language
of the Revenue Sharing Act, by contrast, does not enumerate its purposes,
but merely lists a priority of expenditures.5 4 Consequently, the only parties
entitled to sue under the Revenue Sharing Act are the local, state and
federal governmental units. 55
This section of the Comment assumes that the growing financial crisis
in the local public housing authorities puts in jeopardy the interests of
present and future tenants, as well as those economically associated with
LHA's. The following subsections analyze whether HUD is vulnerable
to legal action by any of these parties. The capacity of the parties to
vindicate their interests under the public housing law reflects the dilemma
of all those who rely on obligations of the federal government growing
out of congressional legislation. Because of the representativeness of the
issues, the questions of soveign immunity and standing will be examined
and the reviewability of the contract relationships under the Housing Act
standards will also be explored.
A.

HUD's Vulnerability to Suit

It would appear that Congress specifically intended to give the parties
to the HUD annual contribution contracts and the beneficiaries thereof
the right to sue HUD upon breach of its obligations thereunder. Jurisdiction for such claims is found under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,56 136117 and
49. See, e.g., id. The statute provides that liability for the bonds cannot extend
to persons who are members or officers of the LHA, nor to the state or local governments. The statute also specifically precludes the use of state or local governmental
revenues to satisfy the bonds. Id.
50. See, e.g., id. § 1550(t).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See Act of Oct. 20, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-512, § 103(a), 86 Stat. 919.
Priority expenditures include expenses for public safety, environmental protection,
public transportation, health, recreation, libraries, social services for the poor or aged,
financial administration, and ordinary capital expenses. Id.
55. Id. §§ 143, 6363.
56. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of interest

and costs, and arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
57. Id. § 1361 states that:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any action in the nature of
mandamus to compel an officer or employee of the United States or any agency
thereof to perform a duty owed to the plaintiff.
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2201. " The Housing Act provides that the "United States Housing
Authority may sue and be sued only with respect to its functions under this
chapter .

. . ."9

The frequent use of similar language by Congress in

conjunction with many quasi-independent corporations specially created
to administer governmental business affairs led the Supreme Court over
30 years ago to presume an amenability to suit where it was not specifically
provided. 60 In determining whether the agency is immune to suit the
courts generally look to whether it is acting as an agent for the United
States in carrying out the purposes of a congressionally authorized program. For example, in National State Bank v. United States,6 the court
found the Federal Housing Authority to be just such an agency when the
bank sued under surety provisions analogous to those provided for in
public housing contracts.6 2 Similarly, in Powelton Civic Home Owners
Association v. HUD,63 the lower court held that HUD was susceptible to
suit by residents significantly affected by its actions, basing its decision on a
broad reading of the Administrative Procedure Act 6 4 favoring HUD's
vulnerability to suit and the specific inclusion of the to sue and be sued
clause in HUD's authorizing legislation. 65 Finally, the fact that Congress
58. Id. § 2201 provides that:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to
Federal taxes, any court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate
pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party
seeking such declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be sought.
Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of a final judgment or
decree and shall be reviewable as such.
Cf. id. § 1491 which vests the Court of Claims with jurisdiction when "founded either
upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress, or any regulation of an executive
department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States." However, the claim may not be maintained simultaneously in both the Court of Claims
and the district court. See, e.g., National State Bank v. United States, 357 F.2d 704,
707 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1404a (1970). See id.§ 1405(b).
60. Keifer v. Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 306 U.S. 381 (1939). The Keifer Court
found that all the circumstances surrounding the formation of the defendant corpora.
tion manifestly demonstrated a congressional intention to make it subject to suit.
Id. at 392. The Court specifically included the United States Housing Authority in its
list of congressionally created corporations which were susceptible to private suit. Id.
at 391 n.3. The amenability to suit of HUD and any other federal agency may, however, be limited by the Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1970). See, e.g., United
States v. Delta Indus., Inc., 275 F. Supp. 934 (E.D. Ohio 1966).
61. 357 F.2d 704 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
62. Id. at 712. The court upheld jurisdiction even though a finding for plaintiffs
would require funds to be taken "out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise
appropriated." Id. See 42 U.S.C. § 1410(e) (1970).
63. 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968), wherein the court held that judicial
review of a HUD denial of a hearing to residents of an urban renewal project area
was provided by statute. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
64. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
65. 284 F. Supp. at 834. Alternatively, the court held that HUD had waived
immunity, citing the Act. Id. The Act specifically provides that:
In the performance of, and with respect to, the functions, powers, and duties
vested in [the HUD Secretary] by this sub-chapter, [§§ 1450 et seq.] the
Administration, notwithstanding the provisions of any other law, may (1)
sue and be sued ....
42 U.S.C. § 1456(c) (1970). It is not clear whether the Secretary would be immune
from suit if he were acting under presidential, rather than congressional, mandate.
See notes 142-45 and accompanying text infra.
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specifically exempted HUD from taxes under its public housing provisions
but failed to specifically immunize HUD from suit, indicated that Congress
intended to subject HUD to liability for defaults in its contractual
obligations.66

However, the question of the standing of the parties to sue for
enforcement of HUD's obligations under the Housing Act, and particularly the standing of the tenants and bondholders, is more difficult to resolve than the question of HUD's immunity. In Association of Data Processing Service Organizations,Inc. v. Camp,67 the Supreme Court held that
a private data processing business had the requisite standing to sue the
Comptroller of the Currency in order to determine the validity of that
officer's policy determination that national banks could offer data processing
services to customers and other banks as incidental to other banking
services. The Court first noted that, in order to satisfy the constitutional
mandate of a case and controversy as required by article III, there must
be sufficient adversity to guarantee proper illumination of the issues. 68
The measure of this adversity was "whether the plaintiff [alleged] that
the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or otherwise."'6 9 The Court then concluded that "the interest sought to be protected by the complainant [was] arguably within the zone of interests
to be protected or regulated by the statute . . . in question," and conse-

70
quently, the requisite standing was established.
Under the tests delineated in Data Processing, it is clear that the
LHA's have standing to bring suit against HUD. First, the requisite
economic injury is presented by the threat of bankruptcy and loss of funds to
which the LHA's are entitled under the provisions of the Housing Act
as amended. 71 Second, the Act specifically authorizes HUD to establish
annual contribution contracts with the LHA's for a fixed period of years,
thereby bringing the parties and beneficiaries of those contracts within the
72
zone of interest protected by the statute.
Even under the legal interest test in use prior to Data Processing,the
LHA's would be deemed to have standing. According to the rationale

66. See, e.g., Federal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U.S. 229 (1935) (concerning the
immunity of the Federal Land Bank). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1405(d) (1970).
67. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
68. Id. at 151-52. The Court cited Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968), as
authority for this constitutional aspect of the standing test. Id. at 151.
69. Id. at 152.
70. Id. at 153. See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970) which provides standing to any person
"aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute." The Data
Processing rule has been followed subsequently. See, e.g., Investment Co. Institute

v. Camp, 401 U.S. 617 (1971) ; Arnold Tours v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970). Mr.
Justice Harlan dissented in Investment Co. Institute and emphasized that the zone of
interest test should be satisfied only when the statute explicitly demonstrated, in
specific terms, a congressional intention to protect the plaintiff's interest. 401 U.S.
at 641.
71. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
72. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(a) (1970). For a more specific analysis of the statutory
terms establishing standards for the annual contribution contracts, see notes 119-26
and accompanying text infra.
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an aggrieved party

[U]nless the right invaded [was] a legal right, - one of property,
one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious
invasion,
74
or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege.
Therefore, since the LHA is a party to the annual contributions contract
with HUD,75 even this more rigid "legal interest" test for standing is met.
As to the tenants, however, application of the two-pronged Data
Processing test is less certain in its effect. If the LHA's attempted to have
the 25 per cent income-rental ceiling" lifted, the tenants would meet the
economic injury test because such action would double their rents.7 7 In
challenging HUD's refusal to provide full operating subsidies, the interests
of the tenants and the LHA's coincide. HUD's failure to subsidize the
LHA's injures the tenants economically because it reduces the monies
available for maintenance and other tenant services, and jeopardizes the
quality of public housing.7 8 Thus, although the tenants enjoy no specific
legal interest arising out of contract or tort, they may, nonetheless, come

within the test of injury in fact.
In Barlow v. Collins,7 0 certain tenant farmers were granted standing
to challenge a regulation of the Secretary of Agriculture which enlarged
the scope for which assignment of benefits could be made under the Food
and Agriculture Act of 1965.80 The regulation at issue allowed landlords
to require assignment of the future benefits under the Act as a guarantee
of rent, thereby forcing the tenants to obtain all their advances for other
farm needs from the landlord. This economic dependence on the landlord
inhibited the formation of cooperatives and created the economic injury.81
The Barlow court looked to the Act and interpreted specific references
to the tenant farmers' interests, as placing the farmers within the zone of
82
protection provided by Congress.
In Hahn v. Gottlieb,8 3 the rationale of Data Processing and Barlow
was applied to tenants in a federally financed housing project who were
73. 306 U.S. 118 (1939).
74. Id. at 137-38 (footnote omitted). This standard for determining standing has
been commonly referred to as the "legal interest" test. In an opinion concurring in
the results of Data Processing and its companion case, Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S.
159 (1970), Mr. Justice Brennan rejected the legal interest test because he felt that it
went to the merits and not to the question of standing. Id. at 167-73 (concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Cf. National State Bank v. United States, 357 F.2d 704
(Ct. Cl. 1966).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(a) (1970).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (Supp. I, 1971).
77. Prior to the 25 per cent income-rental ceiling, it was very common for lowincome housing tenants to spend over 50 per cent of their income on rent. Removal
of the ceiling would surely reinstitute such prohibitive rates. See Genung, supra note
25, at 232.
78. See Genung, supra note 13, at 747-48.

79. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
80. 7 U.S.C. § 1444(b)

(1970).

81. 397 U.S. at 164.
82. Id. at 164-65.
83. 430 F.2d 1243 (Ist Cir. 1970).
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objecting to rent increase allowances by HUD in their negotiation with
the project's owners. The First Circuit found the plaintiffs' allegation that
rental limits and other tenant rights protected under the Housing Act
were in jeopardy was adequate to permit standing. 84 The fact that the
Act was not primarily intended to protect the, tenants was not deemed
crucial. 85 The United States Housing Act declares "families of low
income," particularly "larger families" and "families consisting of elderly
persons" as its primary beneficiaries, and specifically protects the rights
of tenants against exclusion from LHA board membership. 86 The Brooke
amendments establish a rent ceiling which must be individually applied
and cannot, under usual circumstances, be exceeded by the LHA.87 Consequently, the interest of the public housing tenants is closely analogous to
the tenant interests in Hahn and Barlow. If the rationale of these cases
were followed, the tenants could demonstrate a cognizable economic injury
in fact, and a congressional intent to protect their interests sufficient to
provide them with standing to sue HUD for withholding operating subsidies from the LHA units in which they reside. 88
84. Id. at 1246-47.
85. Id. at 1246 n.3. See Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d
920 (2d Cir. 1968). Norwalk CORE was decided prior to Data Processing and
held that persons displaced from an urban renewal area had standing. Cf. McKinney
v. Washington, 442 F.2d 726 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
See Talbot v. Romney, 334 F. Supp. 1074, 1078-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), where
the court found that under Data Processing a resident in the local urban renewal
area had standing, but could not prevail. The Talbot court found a logical nexus
between the type of claim asserted and the party raising it, and therefore, concluded
that the plaintiff had standing even though she could not demonstrate a legal interest
which was protected under the Act. Id. at 1079. But see Gart v. Cole, 263 F.2d 244
(2d Cir. 1959). In Gart, the Second Circuit denied standing to residents living
adjacent to an urban renewal site because the plan had an impact of a general, public
nature and an insufficient effect on individual interests to give the residents standing.
Id. at 250. Compare the duties owed to off-site residents with the duties imposed by
the Housing Act toward persons already in public housing as discussed in notes 86-88
and accompanying text infra.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (Supp. 1,1971).
88. See Johnson v. Redevelopment Agency, 317 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1963), in
which the court held that area residents did not have standing to challenge the relocation plans of the HUD Secretary and the local redevelopment agency. In Johnson,
there was no allegation of discrimination, nor was there any indication that Congress
intended to protect the interests of this class of plaintiffs. Id. at 874. The court
rejected the plaintiffs' claim that, under the Act, they were third-party beneficiaries
of the contract between HUD and the local agency:
The federal courts have consistently held that those not parties to a contract
have no standing to enforce conditions imposed on redevelopment agencies by the
United States, although those suing would benefit from such enforcement.
Id. at 874, citing Gart v. Cole, 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1959). But see Shannon v.
HUD,436 F.2d 809 (3d Cir. 1970).
There may also be an additional problem of jurisdiction for the tenants, as
the amount in controversy must exceed $10,000 under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In Hahn,
the First Circuit noted this potential barrier:
[Pllaintiffs' claim against their landlord [to reform the lease] must be based on
28 U.S.C. § 1331, which requires a jurisdictional amount of $10,000. Plaintiffs
cannot aggregate their claims to meet this amount unless they assert a common
and undivided interest. Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969). In this case, the
rights of the plaintiffs "appear to arise only from the status of each as individual
lessee of a portion of the project premises." Potrero Hill Community Action
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Although the bondholders are given certain protections under the
Act8 9 which might, arguably, bring them within the zone of interest test, it
is likely that the deferred nature of their interests9" and the protections
provided in the event of default 9' would induce courts to deny review for
lack of ripeness, if not for lack of standing. 92 However, a policy argument
can be advanced that requiring bondholders to wait until default increases
the risk potential of the investment in LHA bonds, and may decrease the
marketability of the bonds. This effect would, in turn, jeopardize the
93
capacity of LHA's to raise capital for construction.
B.

Reviewability of HUD's Administration of the Housing Act

Once it is assumed that one or more of the plaintiffs has standing to
sue HUD, there is the need for a further determination of whether or
not the administration of the Act has been made reviewable. Along with
the more liberal test of standing developed in Data Processing,94 the Court
therein also favored a presumption of reviewability. Noting its reservations
on nonreviewability, the Court stated:
There is no presumption against judicial review and in favor of administrative absolutism (see Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136, 140), unless that purpose is fairly discernible in the statutory
scheme. Cf. Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Board, 320
9
U.S. 297. 5
After resolving the question of standing in favor of the plaintiffs, the
Data Processing Court considered the issue of reviewability and looked
Committee v. Housing Authority, 410 F.2d 974, 978 (9th Cir. 1969). Thus, we
lack jurisdiction to consider plaintiffs' attack on their lease.
430 F.2d at 1245 n.1.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 1414 (1970) provides that the annual contribution contracts may
not be amended or superseded in any manner which would impair the rights of the
bondholders.
90. The payment of the face value of the bonds is not due until maturity, and
any sale of the local units must first satisfy the obligations on the bonds. In most
cases, it has been estimated that the value of the land, and the improvements thereon,
would meet the obligations of the bonds. Finch Interview, supra note 38. For a
historical discussion of the bondholder interests, see Miller, supra note 38, at 7-13.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 142a(c) (1970). See notes 39 & 89 and accompanying text supra.
92. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (threats of prosecution for violation of law controlling medical advice on contraception insufficient to show ripeness) ;
Rescue Army v. Municipal Ct., 331 U.S. 549 (1947) (contested ordinance restricting
solicitation for charitable contributions held not ripe) ; United Public Workers v.
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947) (threats under the Hatch Act to release employees for
political organization insufficient to show ripeness).
93. For an analysis of the market for such securities during the early years of
the Act, see Miller, supra note 38, at 13-17.
94. See notes 67-70 and accompanying text supra.
95. 397 U.S. at 157. In Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148
(1967), the Court held that regulations established by the Food and Drug Administration were subject to pre-enforcement review. The Court found that the congressional fear of placing unfettered discretion in executive department officials had
prompted the inclusion of provisions for review despite Justice Department opposition.
Id. at 143. In Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943),
the Court found an implied congressional intent to preclude judicial review and
thereby avoid potential disputes which might endanger the peaceful nature of labor
negotiation. Id. at 302-04.
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to the Administrative Procedure Act which provided for judicial review
"except to the extent that - (1) statutes preclude judicial review or (2)
agency action is committed to agency discretion by law." 96 The Court
concluded that neither exception was applicable, and since the enabling
statute did not specifically preclude judicial review, held that the rulings
7
of the Comptroller were reviewable.
The most recent Supreme Court pronouncement on reviewability was
made in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe. 9s In rejecting
the Government's argument that the second exception to the Administrative
Procedure Act made the questioned agency action unreviewable because it
was committed to agency discretion by law, 99 the Court concluded:
This is a very narrow exception. .

.

. The legislative history of

the Administrative Procedure Act indicates that it is applicable
in those rare instances where "statutes are drawn in such broad
terms that in a given case there is no law to apply."' 0 0
In Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 10 1 the Second
Circuit held that residents displaced from an urban renewal area could
obtain review of HUD's contract agreement with the local agency under
section 1455(c) of the 1965 Housing and Urban Development Act, which
required the local authority to provide for the relocation of families dis96. 397 U.S. at 156. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1970).
97. 397 U.S. at 157. A similar application of the Administrative Procedure Act
was made in Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970). The Barlow Court held
that the construction of a statutory term was a matter for judicial determination and
not within the special expertise of the Secretary. Mr. Justice Brennan would have
permitted review of administrative actions whenever the legislative history of the
enabling statute evidenced even the slightest indication that Congress intended to
place the plaintiff in the statutorily protected class. Id. at 174-75 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
98. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
99. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1970). See text accompanying note 96 supra.

100. 401 U.S. at 410. The standard fails to define those instances when the statu-

tory terms will be so broad that there is "no law to apply." The phrase may refer
to situations where the applicable standards are so technical as to be necessarily
delegated to administrative authorities. See, e.g., Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line,
Inc., 356 U.S. 309, 318-19 (1958). But see A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 541 (1935), which suggests that any delegation where there is
"no law to apply" might be void as an invalid delegation of legislative authority.
In Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redev. Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968),
the Second Circuit set out the following test for determining the reviewability of
administrative decisions that involve complex urban renewal projects:
We cannot doubt the necessity of discretionary decision making in urban renewal
planning. This necessity would render unfit for judicial decision many questions
concerning urban renewal ....
This does not mean, however, that every case or
controversy touching this area lies beyond judicial cognizance. Case-by-case
inquiry is necessary, with due regard for the need for judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving problems to be undertaken, and with recognition of the role played by the coordinate branches of the Federal Government
in the planning and implementation of urban renewal.
Id. at 929 (emphasis added). One of the standards noted by the Norwalk court was
"decent, safe and sanitary dwellings." Id. This is a standard similar to that used in
the Housing Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970). The court went on to make a specific
analysis of the class of plaintiffs identified in the statute, and found adequate statutory
standards to provide for judicial review. See note 102 and accompanying text infra.
101. 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968).
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placed by the urban renewal project. 10 2 The court applied three criteria
to determine whether HUD's action was reviewable: (1) an assessment
of the plaintiffs' legal rights as individuals under the Act, 10 or as "private attorneys general; ' ' 1° 4 (2) the presence of adequate standards for
review of the substance of the agency's determination;105 and (3) the
absence of any congressional intent to deny review. 10 6 The court concluded that the plaintiffs came within the statutory zone of interest
(merging a standing test into reviewability) ; that the relocation regulation
provided an adequate standard for review; and that Congress did not intend
to preclude judicial review. Consequently, the agency action was deemed
reviewable. 107 The dissent voiced a theme which reappears in arguments
over judicial intervention in administrative actions. Citing the policy
0°
of Decatur v. Paulding'
against judicial interference with actions of
the executive department, the dissent asserted that such intervention
would thrust the judiciary into administration of the housing program. 10 9
In contrast to the Norwalk court, the First Circuit, in Hahn v.
Gottlieb,1" 0 held that public housing tenants were not entitled to review
of the rent increases negotiated between the Federal Housing Administration and the private builder. The Hahn court, sounding the theme
of the Norwalk dissent, denied review to the tenants because it felt
granting review would undermine the efficient administration of the
Act."' The appropriateness of the issues for judicial review was another
determinative factor 112 noted by the court:
102. 42 U.S.C. § 1455(c) (1970).
103. 395 F.2d at 933-34. The court found that Congress intended to protect this
specific class of persons since one of the larger goals of the Act was the elimination
of slum conditions. Id.
104. A recent case somewhat advancing the private attorney general doctrine is
Citizens Comm. for the Hudson Valley v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970), where the Second Circuit granted standing to certain
conservationist groups as persons sufficiently affected by the governmental action.
105. 395 F.2d at 935-36. The court stated specifically that it was not dealing
with the planning of urban renewal programs, nor with the relocation standard set
by Congress. Instead, it was dealing only with the procedural rights of the complaining parties. Id. at 936. This should be contrasted with the claims of the LHA's
which are both procedural and substantive.
106. Id. at 935.
107. Id. at 929.
108. 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840). The Decatur Court suggested:
The interference of the courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of
the executive departments of the Government, would be productive of nothing
but mischief ....
Id. at 516.
109. 395 F.2d at 938.
110. 430 F.2d 1243, 1251 (1st Cir. 1970). Under the procedures of the housing
program considered in Hahn, the private builder and owner had to apply to HUD
for rental increases. The housing program provides below-market federal loans and
insurance to the builder. Id. at 1245.
111. Id. at 1250. See Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation Bd., 320 U.S.

297 (1943).

112. 430 F.2d at 1249-50. In Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309
(1958), shippers initiated suit to oppose the toll rates established by the congressionally created Panama Canal Corporation. In reviewing the agency's annual budget,
the Comptroller General recommended a downward revision of the tolls. Based on this
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[C]ourts are ill-equipped to superintend economic and managerial
decisions of the kind involved here. This is not a case which can
be resolved3 by "judicial application of canons of statutory construction.""
In denying review, the Hahn court indicated, however, that its decision
did not necessarily preclude future review of questions related to the
administration of housing programs. 1 4 Applying the rationales of Hahn
and Norwalk to the annual contribution contracts between the LHA's
and HUD, it is clear that certain aspects of the statutory obligation
between the parties are more likely to be subject to review than others.
Hahn demonstrated that where detailed managerial considerations are
in question, the courts will probably not enter into the quagmire of
attempted judicial review." 5 For example, the administration of the annual contribution contracts may include difficult managerial questions
such as the computation of subsidy requirements," a6 or require resolution
of the dispute over the costs of services which the LHA deems essential,
but which HUD views as luxuries." 7
recommendation, the shippers brought suit to have the tolls reduced. The Supreme
Court, per Justice Douglas, held, inter alia:
[T]he present conflict rages over questions that at heart involve problems of
statutory construction and cost accounting; whether an operating deficit in the
auxiliary or supporting activities is a legitimate cost in maintaining and operating the canal for purpose of the toll formula. These are matters on which experts
may disagree; they involve nice issues of judgment and choice . . . which require
the exercise of informed discretion.
Id. at 317.
113. 430 F.2d at 1249. The court enumerated the substantive issues as including
an estimate of the cause of cost increases, the causes of tenant vacancies, the reasonableness of managerial expenses, and the proper computation of "reasonable return"
and concluded that "[u]nder these circumstances, we willingly confess our incapacity
to contribute intelligently to the general course of decision on rents and charges." Id.
114. Id. at 1251.
115. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266, 283, 289 (1962) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting), wherein Justice Frankfurter opposed the Supreme Court's excursion into
the complex statistical question of apportionment.
116. See Genung, supra note 25, at 235, wherein the author outlines the problems
of managerial interpretation arising after the first Brooke amendment concerning
such issues as recording of subsidy determinations to the nearest dollar, recomputation
of the "in lieu of taxes" share of the local authority, and application of income
formulas to families in marginal situations.
117. See Brooke & Watson, supra note 31, at 70-71, wherein HUD Assistant
Secretary Watson described how LHA's should compute their operating subsidy needs:
This will entail a careful distinction between (1) the amounts needed to compensate for rental revenue loss and normal increases in operating costs occasioned by inflation and other factors and (2) requests to improve levels of
maintenance and operating services. We will also have to consider the efficiency
of the LHAs management operations to ensure that they are maximizing their
income potential and getting maximum benefits for each dollar spent ...
t . . At the same time, we hope the LHAs will cooperate in refraining from
the temptation to submit larger budget requests than are actually necessary, in
order to establish a better "bargaining" position with the area offices. Those
LHAs that are tempted in this manner will only make it more difficult to make
a convincing case of what the actual need is.
Id. In late November, after NAHRO brought suit against HUD, HUD issued a
circular providing for a limited operating subsidy. See U.S. Dep't of Housing and
Urban Development, Circular HM 7475.12, Nov. 28, 1972. The circular assumed
additional monies would have to be raised by the states themselves if needed.
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Notwithstanding such detailed managerial considerations, the LHA's
contend that there are certain fundamental statutory standards, confirmed
by contract, that require HUD to provide total operational subsidies
and maintain adequate reserves." 8 Those standards of the Act which
are probably capable of judicial review include the following:
(1) The requirement of the Housing Act that "decent, safe, and
sanitary dwellings for families of low income by construction of
public housing"119 be financed through annual federal contributions.
(2) The requirement that the LHA's (a) "assure the low-rent
character of the projects involved," and (b) "achieve and maintain
adequate operating services and reserve funds including payment
of outstanding debts.' 20
(3) The provision that annual contributions be pledged to aid
the LHA's and the concomitant appropriation "in each fiscal year,
out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the
amounts necessary to provide for such payments. ' 2 1 This provision
may be interpreted to mean that the Act and the contracts authorized by the Act obligate HUD to meet the total operation subsidy needs of the LHA.
(4) The requirement that HUD work through, and place primary
responsibility in, the LHA's in order "to assist the several States
and their political subdivisions" in achieving the purposes of the
Act,' 22 by vesting "in the local public housing agencies the maximum amount of responsibility in the administration of the low-rent
housing program, including responsibility for the establishment of
rents and eligibility requirements ....
-123 Therefore, the Act may
be read as precluding unilateral determinations of rent ceilings, 124
income calculations,' 2 5 and limits on operating reserves 126 by HUD
or Congress.
118. The LHA's require reserve funds to insure that adequate cash is available
for current needs. Without such reserves, short delays in LHA receipt of revenue
result in late payments on bills, including wages, or necessitate the borrowing of
funds. Finch Interview, supra note 38.
119. 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970).
120. Id. §§ 1410(a) (1) & (2). The Act limits the fixed contribution payable
annually to "a sum equal to the annual yield, at the applicable going Federal rate
plus 1 percentum, upon the development or acquisition cost of the low-rent housing
or slum-clearance project involved." Id. § 1410(b). This limitation was eliminated
by a Joint House Resolution of Oct. 18, 1972. See U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban
Development, Circular HM 7475.12, Nov. 28, 1972.
121. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(e) (1970). In addition, section 1414 provides for the
modification of annual contribution contracts to promote economies and protect the
low-rent character of the projects. The Act restricts such modifications, however,
where the bondholder interests may be adversely affected. Id. § 1414. See notes
89-93 supra.

122. 42 U.S.C. § 1410 (1970).
123. Id. See id. § 1410(a) (requiring the cooperation of the local political subdivision) ; id. § 1410(g) (requiring the promulgation of the admission criteria, income
standards, and procedures used by the LHA).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (Supp. I,
1971). The rent ceilings were established by the Brooke amendment. See note 2 supra.
125. U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, Circular HM 7465.10, Mar.
16, 1971. This circular sets forth a definition of income, and deductions for certain
support payments, medical expenses, certain occupational expenses, dependent allowances, and certain non-recurring income. The circular is outdated to the extent that
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The essential unanswered question is whether such standards can provide
an adequate basis for judicial review under the reviewability concepts
delineated in Hahn, Norwalk, Data Processing, Barlow, and the Ad-

ministrative Procedure Act. Absent a finding that such standards are
justiciable, the congressional mandate obligating HUD to pay full operational subsidies is unenforceable.
The remainder of this Comment will consider whether the courts
could apply these standards to compel HUD to distribute funds authorized under the Act and to prevent HUD from superseding the present
LHA mechanism. The annual contribution contracts represent one of
the earliest revenue sharing mechanisms and, as such, provide an excellent framework for the analysis of federal-state-local power relations in
the provision of federally funded local services.
IV.

VIABILITY OF THE FEDERAL EXECUTIVE OBLIGATION

To

MAINTAIN THE LOCAL HOUSING AUTHORITY

Under our form of government, the President serves as the nation's
chief executive officer and has primary responsibility for executing the
laws, 127 preparing the annual budget recommendations, 2 and planning
the most effective allocation of expenditures and reserves. 129 President
130
Nixon, through his creation of the Office of Management and Budget,
sought to go beyond the limited concept of budget control and to evaluate
governmental services against clearly defined criteria. In his report to
Congress concerning the new office, the President noted its benefits:
The new Office of Management and Budget will place much greater
emphasis on the evaluation of program performance: on assessing
the extent to which programs are actually achieving their intended
results, and delivering the intended services to the intended recipient.
This is needed on a continuing basis, not as a one-time effort. Program evaluation will remain a function of the individual agencies
it provides that the rental ceiling does not apply to persons on welfare. See U.S.
Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, Circular HM 7465.13, Jan. 18, 1972
(provides that the rental ceiling shall be applicable to welfare recipients).
126. U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, Circular HM 7475.8, Jan.
27, 1972. This circular limited the LHA's operating resources and established "forward funding" procedures to permit advanced budget planning which, in turn, was to
insure that federal subsidies would arrive in advance of monthly expenditures to
eliminate certain cash flow problems. See note 118 supra.
127. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
128. 31 U.S.C. § 16 (1970). The Office of Management and Budget is controlled
by the President and is responsible for overseeing the appropriation requests of
each agency.
129. Id. § 665(c). The statute specifically authorizes the President to apportion
funds in order to avoid deficits. Id. § 665(c) (1). This section also provides for
planned periodic distribution of funds over the calendar year, a minimum of quarterly
review, and the creation of reserves. Id.
130. The Office of Management and Budget was established as of July 1, 1970,
under President Nixon's Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 7959 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Reorganization Plan]. See Exec. Order No. 11,609, 3 C.F.R. 182
(Supp. 1971).
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as it is today. However, a single agency cannot fairly be expected
to judge overall effectiveness in programs that cross agency lines -

and the difference between agency and Presidential perspectives reOffice to evaluate program perquires a capacity in the Executive
13 1
formance whenever appropriate.
Under the Constitution, however, Congress - not the President - has
the power to legislate. In addition, the Constitution denies the President
the power to exercise an item veto on legislation, and permits a twothirds vote of Congress to override the President.132 If, however, categorical impounding is upheld or ignored by the courts, then the President
can acheive the item-veto effect and be beyond congressional control
3
merely by impounding the appropriated funds.
Since courts are generally reluctant to limit the powers of the
Executive, they will probably not interpret bare congressional appropriations as mandates for executive department expenditures.' 3 4 Substantial precedent supports this view, as prior cases have held that where
a congressional act merely provides for a general expenditure of funds
under a broad congressional purpose, the authorization is only permissive.' 35 In San Francisco Redevelopment Agency v. Nixon,136 a California
131. Message of the President to Congress, Mar. 12, 1970, reprinted in 31 U.S.C.A.
§ 16 (1970) (annot.) (emphasis added).
132. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 7.
133. See Church, supra note 6, at 1250. See generally Hearings on Withholding
of Funds for Housing and the Urban Development Programs, Fiscal Year 1971,
Before the Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 115 (1971)

[hereinafter cited as

1971 Housing Hearings]. For other discussions of the impoundment problem, see
Davis, Congressional Power to Require Defense Expenditures, 33 FORDIAM L. REV.

39, 51 (1964) ; Fisher, Funds Impounded by the President: The Constitutional Issue,
38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 124, 136-37 (1969) ; Goosetree, The Power of the President
to Impound Appropriated Funds; with Special Reference to Grants-in-Aid to Segregated Activities, 11 AM. U.L. REV. 32, 42 (1962) ; 119 CONG. REc. 2247 (daily ed.
Feb. 7, 1973) (remarks of Senator Byrd).
134. See Church, supra note 6, at 1249-53; Davis, supra note 133, at 50-56.
135. See McKay v. Central Elec. Power Cooperative, 223 F.2d 623 (D.C. Cir.
1955), wherein the court determined, in effect, that appropriations by Congress for
flood control and electric power did not require that contracts already established
for the lease of power producing facilities be honored. The court of appeals, per
Chief Judge Bazelon, dismissed the suit although it concluded that the Interior
Department could use the funds for the contract purposes:
The Act is permissive only. It does not impose upon appellants a clear affirmative
duty to use the funds for that specific purpose. At least so much is essential
as a bar to effective relief in the nature of a mandamus on specific performance.
Id. at 625 (emphasis added). The court went on to note that any determination of
damages sustained by the contracting power company should await an action in the
Court of Claims for breach of contract. Id. at 625-26. For a discussion of remedies
for governmental breach of contract in relation to the question of governmental
immunity, see note 59 and accompanying text supra.
See also Craig v. Commissioners of District of Columbia, 112 F.2d 205 (D.C.
Cir. 1940) (courts have only limited power to compel the Attorney General to make
payments to a discharged prisoner, even though such payments are provided under
congressional legislation) ; Cipriano Campagna v. United States, 26 Ct. Cl. 316 (1891)
(longevity pay provided by legislation was contingent and variable and, therefore,
not mandatory). Cf. Aleut League v. AEC, 337 F. Supp. 534 (D. Alas. 1971)
(plaintiffs had no right to enjoin detonation of nuclear device).
136. 329 F. Supp. 672 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
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federal district court recently dismissed a suit to compel expenditure of
appropriated funds, stating:
Counsel for plaintiffs and the Court have been unable to find
authority for the proposition that a United States District Court
may compel the head of the Executive Branch of government to
take any action whatsoever. No decided cases since Marbury v.
Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) have even contemplated this
question. It is clear, therefore, that a longstanding policy, if not137
a
positive rule, has avoided such an intra-governmental confrontation.
If impounding is viewed as an act of executive discretion, rather than
an act of a quasi-independent corporation, it presents a direct confrontation between Congress and the Executive which is not likely to be resolved by a court. To sidestep these political implications, the LHA's
must contend that a breach of the annual contribution contracts 138 constitutes a violation of congressional guidelines by an administrator serving
in a ministerial capacity."39 The Act explicitly authorizes enforcement
of the annual contribution contracts since they are guaranteed by the
United States, and since Congress has "authorized to be appropriated
in each fiscal year, out of money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the amounts necessary to provide for such payments.' 40 The
Act provides only minor restrictions on enforcement of the contribution
contracts, which are the primary means to accomplish the basic purposes
of the Act.141 As a result, impoundment of funds which would jeopardize
the vitality of the LHA's frustrates the congressional purpose behind
the Housing Act.
Beginning with Marbury v. Madison,142 the Supreme Court articulated the constitutionally imposed separation of powers. In Marbury,
after concluding that a mandamus order was appropriate to compel the
executive branch to act, Chief Justice Marshall distinguished between
43
officers acting within the political sphere of the presidential authority'
137. Id. at 672. The court was acting on a motion to quash service and dismiss the
President as a party to the action.
138. See notes 36-43 and accompanying text supra.
139. For the purposes of the Act, see notes 86-87 and accompanying text supra.
140. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(c) (1970).
141.
panying
142.
143.

Id. §§ 1410(c), 1410(g), 1414, 1415 (1970). See notes 41-43 and accomtext supra.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
Id. at 158. The Court did, however, hold the ministerial acts of an executive

officer subject to judicial scrutiny, concluding:

He acts, in this respect .. .under the authority of law, and not by the instructions
of the President. It is a ministerial act which the law enjoins on a particular
officer for a particular purpose.
[W]hen the legislature proceeds to impose on that officer other duties; when
he is directed peremptorily to perform certain acts; when the rights of individuals
are dependent on the performance of those acts; he is so far the officer of the
law and is amenable to the laws for his conduct; and cannot at his discretion
sport away the vested rights of others.
Id. at 158, 166 (emphasis added). The Court specifically described the determination of
whether a right had vested as a judicial question. Id. at 166. For a further discussion
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and those acting under some other authority. 4 4 In order to be subject
to court order 145 under the Marbury test, the administrative actions must
be ministerial in nature and affect vested rights. To enforce the rights
of the LHA's under this test, the courts must determine whether the
rights they assert have become vested legal rights.
To analyze properly when a congressional mandate will control agency
administrators, it is helpful to examine cases in which the courts have
found statutes to be sufficiently definite in that they create vested rights
and thereby take the acts of the governmental officers out of the political
and economic spheres exclusively committed to the President. In Kendall
v. United States, 46 the Court held that a federal statute which required
the Solicitor General to determine the amount to be awarded persons
under contract with the Postmaster General was a definite law, making
the actions of the Postmaster General ministerial, and hence enforceable
by a mandamus action. 147 The Postmaster General in Kendall argued
that the determination of proper credits and allowances was within the
political sphere of the President, since the officer's acts were done on
the President's behalf and would affect the credit of the nation.' 48 Although the Kendall Court disavowed any intention to challenge the power
of the executive branch, it did reassert certain congressional powers,
concluding:
[I]t would be an alarming doctrine, that congress cannot impose
upon any executive officer any duty they may think proper, which
of vesting in relation to congressionally created programs, see notes 156-58 and accompanying text infra. The Court stated also, however, that where the officer is acting
under presidential order in political spheres fully delegated to him by the Constitution,
his discretionary acts are not subject to judicial review:
In such cases, [his] acts are [the President's] acts; and whatever opinion may be
entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used, still there
exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion. The subjects are
political: they respect the nation, not individual rights, and being entrusted to
the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive.
5 U.S. at 164. See Kranz, A 20th Century Emancipation Proclamation: Presidential
Power Permits Withholding of Federal Funds from Segregated Institutions, 11 Am.
U.L. REV. 48, 51-52, 63-67 (1962).
144. The view that administrators of congressionally created agencies may be
independently accountable to standards of the enabling statute was implicitly supported by Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579
(1952), wherein the Court held that the President did not have the power to seize
industrial property without a specific congressional authorization. Id. at 589. Characterizing the limits on executive power, Justice Jackson wrote:
When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely only
upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of Congress
over the matter. Courts can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such a case
only by disabling the Congress from acting upon the subject.
Id. at 637-38 (Jackson, J., concurring).
145. See notes 143-44 supra.
146. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
147. Id. at 609-13.
148. Id. at 551-52. See Griffin v. Cochran, 5 Binn. 87, 105 (Pa. 1814) (if the
officer's act entails taking money from the public treasury, it cannot be enforced by
mandamus).
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is not repugnant to any rights secured and protected by the constitution; and in such cases, the duty and responsibility grow out
of and are subject to the
control of the law, and not to the
1 49
direction of the President.

In United States v. Price,15 0 Congress had authorized the Secretary
of the Treasury to pay specific monies to several named persons. 151 The
Court held that the congressional act was explicit in its direction, and
compelled the Secretary by writ of mandamus to pay the designated
amount. 15 2 In contrast, the Court of Claims in Compagna v. United
States 153 held that the petitioner was not entitled to funds claimed to be
due under an appropriation act of Congress, offering the following
distinction:
Frequently there is coupled with an appropriation a legislative indication that the designated amount shall be paid to a person or class
of persons, and from such an appropriation a statutory right arises
upon which an action may be maintained.5 4
Compagna left unresolved the question of what would constitute a sufficient class designation short of the specification by name held to be adequate in Price. If the doctrine espoused by Kendall and Price remains
viable, congressionally created rights may require an accountability of
the governmental officer to Congress, rather than to the President for
purposes of requiring funds to be expended.
In 1967, Ramsey Clark, then United States Attorney General, advised the Secretary of Transportation that a congressional appropriation
of highway funds was merely permissive in character' 5 5 because:
[T]he Secretary [had] the power to defer the availability to the
states of those funds authorized and apportioned for highway construction which have not, by the approval of a project, become the
subject of a contractual obligation on the part of the Federal Government in favor of a state.156
It is approval of a project under that section [23 U.S.C. 106(a)]
which constitutes the contractual obligation of the United States.
149. 37 U.S. at 610. The Court also stated:
To contend that the obligation imposed on the President to see the laws
faithfully executed, implies a power to forbid their execution, is a novel construction of the constitution, and entirely inadmissible.
Id.at 613.
150. 116 U.S. 43 (1885).
151. Id. at 43-44.
152. Id. at 44. See United States v. Louisville, 169 U.S. 249, 254-55 (1898)
United States v. Jordan, 113 U.S. 418, 423 (1885).
153. 26 Ct. Cl. 316 (1891). See note 135 supra.
154. 26 Ct. Cl. at 317.
155. 42 Op. ATr'y GEN. No. 32, at 10 (1967).
156. Id. at 4 (emphasis added.)
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No provision of the act gives any state
a vested right to the appor157
tioned funds prior to such approval.
Under this rationale, the established contracts of approved LHA's would
be vested rights to apportioned funds.158 The Act might then be viewed as
sufficient to provide direct control over the acts of administrative officers,
creating a nonpolitical sphere of agency action under congressional aegis.
In a recent decision, State Highway Commission v. Volpe," 9 a federal
district court found that the language of the Transportation Act' 60
specifically limited the discretion of the Secretary of Transportation. 161
The court ordered the Secretary to obligate the apportionment of trust
2
fund monies provided under this Act for Missouri highway construction.'6
The court noted specifically the language of this Act which required that
''no part of any sums authorized to be appropriated for expenditure
upon any Federal-aid system which has been appointed pursuant to the
provisions of this title shall be impounded" except for expenses of administering the fund. 163
Although several commentators point out that control over the
executive branch may be exercised by impeachment or bargaining for
legislation,'0 it is unlikely that these methods can effectively protect
those in a position comparable to that of the LHA's. The cases holding
that congressionally created public law can establish standards under
which the beneficiaries of congressional programs will have vested rights
once initial contract obligations have been agreed upon suggest a more
viable mechanism.' 6 5 The increasing incidence of executive impoundment
of congressional appropriations may require the development of such an
alternative, particularly in light of the movement toward decentralized
federal spending through revenue sharing. Projects of extended duration
157. Id. at 7-8 (emphasis added).
158. See note 121 supra. During his testimony before a 1971
mittee, HUD Secretary Romney stated:

congressional com-

The table [low rent Public Housing Program] also reflects a total of $112
million in set-asides for operating funds not used in 1971. We do expect - and
the Budget so reflects - that the $37 million balance of the operating subsidy
set-aside provided in the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969 will be
used in 1972. The fact that it is reflected as unused at the end of 1971 is merely
a matter of timing in the anticipated use of subsidy funds.
1971 Housing Hearings, supra note 133, at 167. Secretary Romney also described the
financial plight of the LHA's and the uncertainties attendant to exact calculation of the
subsidy need. Noting the additional appropriation of $75 million in 1970, he concluded:
We do not look upon the additional authorization as a mandate to use that
amount whether or not needed, but as an authority which can be used if the facts
warrant it. In short, the additional $75 million is available for use if needed.
Our current estimates, however, do not indicate that need arising until after
fiscal year 1972. If it should be necessary to use the authorization, it will be used.
Id. at 168.
159. 347 F. Supp. 950 (E.D. Mo. 1972).
160. 23 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1970).
161. 347 F. Supp. at 954.
162. Id.
163. 23 U.S.C. § 101(c) (1970), cited in 347 F. Supp. at 953.
164. See Church, supra note 6, at 1252; Davis, supra note 133, at 56.
165. See notes 146-52 and accompanying text supra.
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by their nature require the continued availability of funds. 160 Although
noncategorical revenue sharing by-passes the question of federal flexibility by locating such flexibility at the local government level, new issues
associated with impoundment may emerge. The present Revenue Sharing
167
Act would base the standard of review on an allocation formula alone,
except for the broad discretion given to the Secretary of the Treasury
to establish regulations to see that all funds are expended for priority expenditures under the Act. 6 Whether such discretion to withhold by the
Secretary will be exercised to reassert federal control over the actual expenditure of tax dollars sent back to the states remains to be seen. If it is,
the only workable method of implementing the Revenue Sharing Act may
be through court action similar to that instituted by the LHA's.
V.

THE

QUESTIONED

NECESSITY

OF

THE

USE

OF

LOCAL

POLITICAL SUB-DIVISIONS TO IMPLEMENT THE
Low-RENT PUBLIC HOUSING

PROGRAM

The LHA's 169 contend that since it is the declared policy of the

United States Housing Act to provide low-income public housing through
state-created LHA's, 170 HUD must maintain those units in a viable
form. Additionally, the LHA's urge that because of their established
contracts, Congress and HUD are barred from unilaterally imposing rent
ceilings 171 and establishing new standards for maintaining financial re166. Effective long-range program development is closely connected to the total
concept of the Program Evaluation Review Techniques used so effectively by Department of Defense Secretary MacNamara in the development of the atomic submarine.
This concept requires the definition of events, activities, time, and resources necessary
to final achievement of any project insofar as possible at the outset of the task.
Efficient management will necessarily depend on bringing the proper resources to
bear at the most advantageous time. For example, the ten-year goal of reaching the
moon necessarily required the allocation of key resources throughout the term of the
project. One year without development resources may significantly affect the achievement of interim events crucial to the accomplishment of the final goal. This is particularly important when the federal role moves from a concept of demonstration
project funding to one of providing resources for on-going operations. For a general
introduction to the Program Evaluation Review Techniques, see FEDERAL ELECTRIC
CORPORATION, A PROGRAMMED INTRODUCTION TO PERT (1967). See also Cahn, New
Sovereign Immunity, 81 HARV. L. REV. 929 n.65 (1968), where the author examines
the use of planning-programming-budgeting systems to specify management responsibilities in federal program administration.
At the same time, however, there is the danger that excessive long-term
contract commitments to local governments may so commit governmental funds to
past priorities that new needs cannot be adequately met. This problem has similarities
to the debt-equity problems of corporations, where excessive debt structures leave
little room for absorbing lean periods in the corporate income cycle and necessarily
limit the capacity of the corporation to use unobligated capital to take on new
ventures for which debt obligations may not be practicable. See 42 Op. ATT'Y GEN.
No. 32, at 8 (1967).
167. Act of Oct. 20, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-512, § 143, 86 Stat. 919.
168. Id. § 123.
169. NAHRO v. HUD, Civil No. 2080-72 (D.D.C., filed Oct. 16, 1972).
170. 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1970).
171. 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (Supp. I,
1971). The rent ceiling was imposed by Congress through the Brooke amendments.
See Norfolk Redev. & Housing Authority v. HUD, Civil No. 298-72-N (E.D. Va.,
filed June 13, 1972).
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Further, because
serves, 17' 2 computing income,17 3 and selecting tenants.
the rent ceilings are causing many LHA's to become insolvent, the LHA's
contend that the ceilings are confiscatory and in violation of the fifth
amendment.
In considering the fifth amendment claims of the LHA's, it is important to note that the imposition of a rent ceiling is consistent with
the purposes of the Housing Act to maintain the low-income character
of the housing projects. 175 Rent ceilings, income deductions, and admission
criteria are merely regulatory and only indirectly affect the LHA property.
Consequently, the courts are not likely to label them direct takings by the
176
federal government.
After the Supreme Court decision in Block v. Hirsh, 177 most courts
have applied three factors to uphold the regulation of income or business
operations: (1) where the control is temporary; (2) where the control is required by an emergency; or (3) where the control is related to a genuine
governmental interest. 78 Nebbia v. New York 179 extended the Block rationale by holding that private property could be regulated - even though its
value would diminish - provided a bona fide governmental interest was
sought to be protected. The Nebbia Court upheld a New York statute regulating milk prices, even though the controls were to be in effect for a long

172. U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, Circular HM 7475.8, at 5,
Jan. 27, 1972. The notice provides for reduction of cash reserves to 40 per cent of the
authorized maximum. Id.
173. U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, Circular HM 7465.10, Mar.
16, 1971. The definition of what constitutes income has a significant effect on actual
revenues due the LHA. The transmittal notice from HUD provided for deductions,
including a five per cent standard deduction, medical expenses, occupational expenses,
non-recurring income and personal exemptions. Id.
174. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(g) (1970). The statute now requires relocation services
by the LHA for persons who no longer qualify and emphasizes the requirements for
a hearing if eligibility is to be determined. Id.
175. Id. §§ 1410(a), (b). If the operating deficits that result from the reduced
rental income are made up by federal subsidies, the rent for public housing subsidies
will never exceed more than 25 per cent of the income of qualifying persons. Embry
Interview, supra note 18. However, the rental cost to tenants prior to the ceiling
had sometimes reached 50 per cent of their total income. Id.
176. Cf. California Teachers Ass'n v. Newport Mesa School Dist., 333 F. Supp.
436 (C.D. Cal. 1971). In this case, certain California teachers sought to enjoin the
application of the 1970 Economic Stabilization Act to wage increases negotiated before
the Act "froze" wages. The court rejected the argument that imposition of the freeze
would constitute an illegal confiscation and upheld the application of the Act. In
reviewing the petitioners' fifth amendment challenge, the court noted that "[wihile
[the fifth amendment] does forbid the taking of property or the deprivation of it
without due process, the prohibition refers only to direct appropriation of an individual's property." Id. at 443. The court also held that the indirect contract
impairment was valid, since it was balanced by a legitimate and overriding governmental objective in controlling inflation. Id. at 444.
177. 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
178. The Block decision was made in the aftermath of World War I, and the
emergency legislation placing rent ceilings on properties in Washington, D.C. was
limited to a two-year period. The Court characterized the governmental interest as
important enough to justify some degree of public control. Id. at 156. The Court
found that the statute did not "go too far" in that "[m]achinery is provided to secure
the landlord a reasonable rent." Id. at 156-57. See Comment, Residential Rent Con-

trol in New York City, 3 COLUM. 3.L. & Soc.
179. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
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period of time and were not in response to any particular emergency. In
holding that the statute was not confiscatory, the Nebbia Court concluded:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making
of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern.
The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute....
Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to
regulate it in the common interest.' 80
After one accepts the right of the government to intervene in the
public interest, the major issue in regulation is a determination of the
limits within which this control may be exercised. The courts have
repeatedly found ways to rationalize forms of governmental regulation
even where financial injury would inure to the regulated party. In Bowles
v. Willingham,'8 the Court upheld certain rent control provisions of the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942182 and concluded:
A member of the class which is regulated may suffer economic losses
not shared by others. His property may lose utility and depreciate
in value as a consequence of regulation. But that has never been a
barrier to the exercise of the police power.
[W]e need not determine what constitutional limits there are
to price fixing legislation. Congress was dealing here with conditions
created by activities resulting from a great war effort. . . . A nation
which can demand the lives of its men and women in the waging
of that war is under no constitutional necessity of providing a system
of price control on the domestic front which will assure each land18 3
lord a "fair return" on his property.
Since Bowles, several courts have examined the effect of rent control
legislation which has severely limited the extent of the landlord's return,
and the courts have consistently upheld their constitutionality,184 even
185
though the rent ceiling might have forced the landlord to operate at a loss.
In applying prior case law to the constitutional claims of the LHA's,
it must be remembered that although these claims arise during an economic
crisis1 8 6 and that the governmental restrictions imposed by the Housing
Act are in the public interest,' 8 7 the contended effect of the ceiling is
180. Id. at 523.
181. 321 U.S. 503 (1944).
182. Act of Jan. 30, 1942, ch. 26, § 1, 56 Stat. 23.
183. 321 U.S. at 518-19.
184. See, e.g., Stoneridge Apartments Co. v. Lindsay, 303 F. Supp. 677, 680
(S.D.N.Y. 1969) ; Israel v. City Rent & Rehabilitation Administration, 285 F. Supp.
908 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Cf. Druker v. Sullivan, 322 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Mass. 1971).
185. See Teeval Co. v. Stern, 301 N.Y. 346, 93 N.E.2d 884 (1950). The Teeval
court found that since a rent control act was enacted during a period of emergency,
it could remain in operation after the emergency ceased, even though it forced the
landlord to operate at a loss. Id. at 352, 93 N.E.2d at 890. See Comment, supra note
178, at 39-40 & nn.107-14.
186. See, e.g., ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84
Stat. 796, which reflects an early congressional concern for the current economic crisis.
187. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) ; Block v.
Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
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not simply a reduction of income, but the creation of insolvency. There
has been no indication that the rent ceiling is temporary, and its effects
are not limited to a few members of the affected class, but extend to
The
approximately 250,000 of the 1,000,000 units now operating.18
present application of the rent ceiling to LHA's without the provision
of subsidies, arguably, goes beyond prior court holdings since it threatens
the survival of the LHA's, the very means chosen by Congress to
achieve the legislative purpose of low-income housing. The irony is that
when combined with adequate subsidies, the rent ceiling supports the

purpose of making housing available to the lowest income groups. 1 89
Consequently, to the extent the LHA's seek removal of the ceiling to
remain solvent, the interests of low-income housing tenants conflict with
those of the LHA.
Even if the effects of the rent ceiling do not give the LHA's a
basis for having that portion of the Act declared unconstitutional as
confiscatory, it may provide additional leverage to force HUD to meet
the entire subsidy needs as occasioned by the effects of the rental
ceiling. 190 Absent an infusion of adequate funds within a reasonable
period of time, it is likely that operational deficiencies' 91 will engulf the
LHA's.
The LHA's dilemma is increased significantly by attempts of the federal
government to impose regulations and procedures which it feels the public
interest demands. Many of these regulations have at least an indirect
impact on the operating costs of the local authority. '9 2 In Thorpe v.
Housing Authority,193 the Court upheld the validity of a HUD circular
requiring certain eviction procedures, including notice, private conferences, and record keeping, because it felt that such practices had a
"minimal effect" on the local authority's operation. 9 4 The Court concluded, however, that any HUD directives which derogated substantial
contract rights would be invalid. 193 The Thorpe Court found that under
the questioned circular, the respective obligations of both -IUD and
the housing authority under the annual contribution contract remained
188. Telephone interview with Alex Hewes, Staff Member of the Senate Committee
of Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Washington, D.C., Sept. 21, 1972.
189. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
190. See notes 19-21 & 34 and accompanying text supra.
191. Such operational deficiencies may also arise from a reduced market for LHA
bonds, reluctance of local political subdivisions to maintain former levels of "in lieu
payments," and reduced maintenance and upkeep. See Rapaport, The Housing Crisis,
26 REcORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 440 (1971); Rosenn, Controlled Rents and Uncontrolled
Inflation: The Brazilian Dilemma, 17 Am. J. ComP. L. 239 (1969) (examines the
difficulties in eliminating rent controls once instituted) ; Comment, The Rent Restriction Law of Northern Ireland, 22 N. IR. L.Q. 99 (1971).
192. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Housing and Urban Development, Circular HM
7465.6, Aug. 10, 1970, in which HUD required the elimination of certain clauses
thought to overreach the rights of tenants, including exculpatory clauses and waivers
of the right to appeal.
193. 393 U.S. 268 (1969).
194. Id. at 278-79.
195. Id. at 279.
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essentially unchanged, and refused to enjoin the application of the circular to the LHA. 19 6 The implication of the Court that direct changes
in the contribution contracts by the administrative agency would be invalid is important to the LHA. Unless this implication in Thorpe is
valid, HUD can directly affect the survival of LHA's by indirect means,
including regulation of income computation, reserve accumulations, and
admission criteria. Consequently, if the courts refuse to limit HUD's
unilateral imposition of new conditions on the annual contribution contracts,
the statutory mandate of local control seems, at best, the worst part of an
illusory contract.
Notwithstanding the language of the Act placing reliance on local
control, the rationale underlying the commitment to local control in the
Housing Act 197 is probably no longer

valid.

Prior to

1937, lower

federal courts uniformly held that the federal government had no right
of eminent domain within the states for the purpose of low-income
public housing. 198 In United States v. Certain Lands in City of Louis-

ville,19 9 the Sixth Circuit held that, although the National Industrial
Recovery Act20 0 attempted to foster low-cost housing and slum clearance,
2 01
it did not authorize the federal government to exercise eminent domain.
The Sixth Circuit also noted the possible invalidity of the Act as an
unconstitutional delegation of the legislative power because there were
no adequate standards to control federal land acquisition.2 0 2 The reasoning of the dissent in that case foretold developments which are beginning to emerge today in the LHA controversy. It stated that the
standards in the Act were sufficient; that Congress had the power of
taxation to provide for the general welfare within article I; that the goals of
slum clearance and provisions of low-cost housing were of national scope;
and that the existence of a similar power in the states did not preclude the
196. Id. at 277-78. The Court noted:
A far different case would be presented if HUD were a party to this suit arguing
that it could repudiate its obligation under the annual contributions contract because the Authority had failed to apply the circular.
Id. at 279 n.33. Cf. Escalera v. New York City Housing Authority, 425 F.2d 853
(2d Cir. 1970).
197. 42 U.S.C. § 1401(a) (1970).
198. See United States v. Certain Lands in City of Louisville, 78 F.2d 684 (6th
Cir. 1935) ; United States v. Certain Lands in City of Detroit, 12 F. Supp. 345 (E.D.
Mich. 1935). See also Franklin, supra note 13, at 63, wherein the author stated that
the initial undercutting of federally built and operated public housing caused the
Government to abandon plans for such construction until initiating temporary federal
efforts during the war.
199. 78 F.2d 684 (6th Cir. 1935).
200. Act of June 16, 1933, ch. 90, §§ 201-20, 48 Stat. 200. The Act authorized
the presidential appointment of an administrator to develop low-cost housing and
to participate in slum clearance either by cooperation with local political subdivisions
or through federal construction, including utilization of the power of eminent domain.
201. 78 F.2d at 687. "In the exercise of its police power a state may do those
things which benefit the health, morals, and welfare of its people. The federal government has no such power within the states." Id.
202. The court cited A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S.
495 (1935), and Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935), These cases were
construed more narrowly, however, in Kapourelos v. United States, 306 F. Supp.
1034 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
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extension of such power to the federal government under the general
203
welfare provision in the Constitution.
Although the administrative pattern for public housing had already
been established, the later case of In re United States20 4 distinguished
Louisville and concluded that the Louisville decision turned on the indefiniteness of the plan for slum clearance. The court relied on two
landmark Supreme Court cases, Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 20 5 and
Helvering v. Davis, 20 6 decided subsequent to Louisville, and upheld the

power of Congress to tax for the general welfare where that welfare
involved national as well as local problems. 20 7 The court adopted the
presumption created in Helvering that the definition of the general welfare is entrusted to the discretion of Congress and is presumed correct
"unless the choice is clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an
exercise of judgment. ' '208 In light of the present day presumptions in
favor of the congressional power to determine what is a permissible
public purpose for governmental intervention, it is almost certain that
if Congress declared that the low-cost public housing objectives of the
Housing Act could best be achieved by the use of federally controlled
projects, the courts would uphold that power. In fact, the first steps
to accomplish such intervention were taken by certain proposed modifications to the Housing Act in 1971. As set forth by Senator Brooke,
these modifications would:
[P]ut in motion a program to identify "housing emergency areas"
and provide direct Federal provision of housing in these areas. These
"housing emergency areas" would thereafter be defined as areas where
a substantial number of low- and moderate-income families reside or
work, who need housing, and where there is no sponsor willing to
20 9
provide such housing.
It has been suggested that such centralized administration would: (1)
permit allocation of low-income public housing units on the basis of need
203. 78 F.2d at 689 (Allen, J., dissenting). The dissent cited Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), and the position taken therein that a congressionally declared public purpose is to be narrowly reviewed by the courts. 78
F.2d at 690. The dissent went on to cite other uses of the power of eminent domain
which had been permitted to the federal government, including the taking of land for
irrigation and construction of an aerial tramway. Id. See Keyes v. United States,
119 F.2d 444, 448 (D.C. Cir. 1941), which upheld the power of the federal government to undertake slum clearance, assuming that it exercised the powers of a state
within the District of Columbia.
204. 28 F. Supp. 758 (W.D.N.Y. 1939). See Oklahoma City v. Sanders, 94 F.2d
323, 327 (10th Cir. 1938), which held that the federal taking of public lands for lowcost housing was a public use, a finding in opposition to that in Louisville on
similar facts.
205. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
206. 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
207. 28 F. Supp. at 764.
208. 301 U.S. at 640-41. See United States v. Boyle, 52 F. Supp. 906 (N.D.
Ohio 1943).
209. See 117 CONG. REc. 21,158 (daily ed. Dec. 10, 1971) (remarks of Senator
Brooke).
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rather than local political receptivity ;210 (2) circumvent certain local social
pressures; and (3) reduce administrative overhead. 21 1 Certainly, administrative centralization would reduce certain double management systems
required when both local and federal authorities try to administer the
projects. Similarly, the establishment of a definite system for funneling
tax revenue would reduce administrative waste by giving total control
to the local authority. 212 Thus, a justification could be made for a shift
in congressional focus to supplant the LHA as a means of achieving the
goals of low-income public housing and to reformulate the Housing Act's
approach by vesting primary responsibility in regionalized authorities operated by the federal government. All of these steps are arguably achievable
under the police power of Congress and under its constitutional powers
to tax and spend for the benefit of the general welfare of the nation. 213
Yet, the whole concept of federal revenue sharing stands in stark contrast
to the efficiencies of federal regionalization of local housing authorities.
Although the Revenue Sharing Act provides for reallocation of federal
monies where a state government assumes local governmental expenditures 21 4 and where governmental reorganization occurs, 215 its entitlement
mechanisms favor local splinter attacks on problems rather than attacks
encompassing larger geographic areas. Observing the history of the LHA
as a mechanism for problem solving, it is conceivable that major conflicts
will arise as regional and national solutions for problem solving collide with
locally controlled programs under the new federalism.
VI.

CONCLUSIONS

This Comment's analysis of the intragovernmental power relationships
under the current public housing law began with a recognition that the
LHA's can obtain court enforcement of the annual contributions contracts
only after a determination is made that some party has the requisite
standing to be heard in court, that sovereign immunity does not bar the suit,
and that the disputed contracts and their statutory authorizations are reviewable by a court and are not solely within agency discretion. As
examined, the local housing authority dilemma draws attention to the
processes required to set judicial action in motion when the acts of federal
210. See Franklin, supra note 13, at 70 n.ll.
211. Id. at 77 n.23. The author noted that recently in England several thousand
authorities were consolidated into less than one hundred with substantial cost savings
and administrative efficiencies. Id.
212. See text accompanying notes 122-23 supra. The requirements for supervising
a national information system to provide data on mobility, characteristics, numbers of
tenants occupying units, and service needs, are distinctly different from the data
required for day-to-day management decisions in the local authority. Consequently,
data collection in HUD, which depends on information received through local
authorities, is grossly inadequate to meet the larger needs of HUD and Congress for
national planning. Shaw Interview, supra note 9.
213. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
214. Act of Oct. 20, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-512, § 107(b) (2), 86 Stat. 919.
215. Id. § 108(d) (6).
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officials are being reviewed by federal courts. 216 The complexities of
obtaining remedies are heightened by the interplay of the rights of lowincome tenants 217 and bondholders 218 who are affected by the federal-local
contracts - this is particularly true where the larger objectives of the
federal program depend on maintaining public confidence in the continuity
of federal support allocated to it.
In reviewing the power of the executive branch to exert control and
formulate policy by withholding appropriated funds, this Comment has
acknowledged those cases which hold that Congress has the power to
create laws which expressly authorize governmental officials to serve as
"congressional" agents.2 19 Those cases indicate that such congressional
delegations, when not within the political sphere of action specifically reserved to the President, require that the governmental officer be held
accountable to the statutory mandate. Although primitively defined, this
concept assumes that the strength of congressional policy making and program development must depend on more than the impractical powers of
220
impeachment or political negotiation.
Since the creation of the Housing Act of 1937, the actions of courts
and Congress portend direct governmental intervention to resolve national
housing problems. At the same time, however, Congress and the President
have undertaken massive efforts to share the federal revenues with local
governments. 221 Although the Revenue Sharing Act uses more specific
allotment formulae to establish entitlement 222 than the Housing Act language used to mandate operational subsidies, 223 the difficulty of finding
reviewable standards for detailed federal-state contracts controlling the
administrative agency authorized to administer the funds is the same. The
response of the courts to the appeals of the LHA's may play a significant
role in establishing important ground rules for the allocation of intergovernmental power in future federal revenue sharing and other congressionally created programs. The judicial response is, however, of significant immediate concern. It will determine whether low-income tenants,
already facing a housing crisis, will see the dissolution of present public
housing accommodations despite the declared purpose and intent of Congress
to meet their housing needs.
Robert B. Haldeman
216. See notes 112-17 and accompanying text supra.
217. See notes 85-88 and accompanying text supra.

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

See notes 89-91 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 142-45 and accompanying text supra.
See notes 143-49 supra.
Act of Oct. 20, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-512, 86 Stat. 919.
Id. §§ 106-08.
42 U.S.C. § 1402(1) (Supp. I, 1971).
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